Nicomachean Ethics

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Nicomachean Ethics (Greek Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια, transliterated Ethika Nikomacheia; gen.: Ἠθικῶν Νικομαχείων, Ethikōn Nikomacheiōn; Latin Ethica Nicomachea) is the name normally given to the most well-known work by Aristotle on ethics. It plays a prominent role in defining Aristotelian ethics, and is widely considered one of the most important historical philosophical works, having for example a very important impact upon European Medieval Philosophy, and hence indirectly upon Modern Philosophy. Many parts of the Nicomachean Ethics are well known in their own right, and have been referred to not only by philosophers, but in legal and theological traditions. Particularly important authors influenced by this work in different periods include Averroes, Marsilius of Padua, Thomas of Aquinas, Alasdair MacIntyre and Martha Nussbaum. Great modernists on the other hand, such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes, clearly saw the Aristotelian tradition in practical thinking as having become a great impediment to philosophy in their time, making the work very important to them also.

The work consists of ten books, originally separate scrolls, and is understood to be based on notes from his lectures at the Lyceum which were either edited by or dedicated to Aristotle's son, Nicomachus. It is very often abbreviated “NE,” or “EN,” and books and chapters are generally referred to by Roman and Arabic numerals, respectively, along with corresponding Bekker numbers. (Thus, “NE II.2, 1103b1” means “Nicomachean Ethics, book II, chapter 2, Bekker page 1103, Bekker column b [the column on the right side of the page], line number 1.) In many ways this work parallels the similar Eudemian Ethics, which has only eight books, and the two works can be fruitfully compared. Books V, VI, and VII of the Nicomachean Ethics are identical to Books IV, V, and VI of the Eudemian Ethics. Opinions about the relationship between the two works, for example which was written first, and which originally contained the three common books, is divided.

Aristotle describes his ethical work as being different from his other kinds of study, because it is not just for the sake of contemplating what things are, but rather to actually become good ourselves. It is therefore practical rather than theoretical in the original Aristotelian senses of these terms. It is in this sense connected to Aristotle's other practical writings on Politics. It also aims at people becoming good, though politics takes the perspective of a law-giver.[1]

Synopsis

Aristotle argues that the correct approach in studying such controversial subjects as Ethics or Politics, which involve discussing what is true about what is beautiful or just, is to start with what would be roughly agreed to by people of good up-bringing and experience in life, and to work from there to a higher understanding.[2]

Taking this approach, Aristotle begins by saying that the highest good for humans, the highest aim of all human practical thinking, is eudaimonia, a Greek word often translated as well-being or happiness. Aristotle in turn argues that happiness is properly understood as a way of being in action of the human psuchē, traditionally translated as "soul", in accordance with virtue (Greek aretē, sometimes translated as "excellence"), in a stable way that endures throughout life. Happiness therefore depends upon being in accordance with virtue, and if there are several virtues, upon the best and most complete or perfect of them. An excellent human will be a person good at living life, who does it well and beautifully (kalos), a serious (spoudaios) person, in the same way that one contrasts harpists and serious harpists, and Aristotle also asserts as part of this starting point that virtue for a human must involve reason in thought and speech (logos), as this is a special task (ergon) of human living.[3]

From this starting point, Aristotle goes into discussion of Ethics. Aristotelian Ethics is about what makes a virtuous character (ethikē aretē) possible, which is in turn necessary if happiness is to be possible. Character is ēthos in Greek, related to modern words such as ethics, ethical and ethos. Aristotle does not however equate character with habit (ethos in Greek, with a short "e") because real character involves conscious choice, unlike habit. Instead of being habit, character is a hexis like health or knowledge, meaning it is a stable disposition which must be pursued and maintained with some effort. However, good habits are described as a precondition for good character. By doing the right actions, often first under the influence of teachers, we develop the right habits, and from having the right habits we develop the right character, allowing us a chance of achieving eudaimonia.[4]

In Latin the habits are morae or mores, giving us words like "moral", and Aristotle's term for virtue of character (ethikē aretē) is traditionally often translated as "moral virtue".

By book VII, Aristotle eventually comes to argue that the highest of all human virtues is itself not practical, being contemplative wisdom (1177a), but he also makes it clear that the possibility of ever achieving this supreme condition is inseparable from achieving all the virtues of character, or "moral virtues".[5]

Book I

Book 1 begins to define the subject matter, with some very important digressions. As is typical of Aristotle, he considers common opinions and the opinions of poets and philosophers as he progresses. The introductory book is remarkable for the way in which "digressions" explaining the method which has been chosen, constantly interrupt what is apparently the main flow of discussion.

The digressions concerning who should study Ethics, and how

The digressions in this book begin by explaining the type of person who should be involved in considering this subject, and the dangers of approaching it wrongly, and eventually become an explanation of why the Ethics is being structured in a way which may seem unphilosophical according to the norms of Aristotle's teacher, Plato.

Chapter 3 is a digression about accuracy and at the same time about whether ethics can be treated in an objective way, pointing out that the "things that are beautiful and just, about which politics investigates, involve great disagreement and inconsistency, so that they are thought to belong only to convention and not to nature". For this reason Aristotle claims it is important not to demand too much precision, like the demonstrations we would demand from a mathematician, but rather to treat the beautiful and the just as "things that are so for the most part". We can do this because people are good judges of what they are acquainted with, but in turn this implies that the young (in age or in character), being inexperienced, are not suitable for study of this type of political subject.[6]

Chapter 4 continues, but with so many opinions available a new digression is made, related to the previous one, asking whether we should try to argue from first principles or else "go up" towards them from what is known to us. He suggests that in this case we need to begin with what is known to us, once again emphasizing that to discuss this topic we have already had a good up-bringing.[7]

Chapter 6 contains a famous digression in which Aristotle appears to question his "friends" who "introduced the forms", i.e. what is now known as the Theory of Forms, by which he must certainly be referring to Plato and his school, for while both "the truth and one's friends" are loved "it is a sacred thing to give the highest honor to the truth". The section is an explanation of why the Ethics will not seek "The Good" as a universal thing which all things called good have in common. Aristotle says that while all the different things called good do not seem to have the same name by chance, it is perhaps better to "let go for now" because this attempt at precision "would be more at home in another type of philosophic inquiry", and would not seem to be helpful for discussing how particular humans should act, in the same way that doctors do not need to philosophize over the definition of health in order to treat each case.[8]

Chapter 7 ends with yet another reference to this avoidance of discussing a universal good. He remarks that "both a carpenter and a geometrician look for a right angle, but in different ways", the point being that one ought to ensure "that side issues do not become greater than the work being done". Indeed, "it is sufficient in some cases for it to be shown beautifully that something is so, in particular such things as concern first principles.... For the beginning seems to be more than half of the whole, and many of the things that are inquired after become illuminated with it". He mentions that perception of first principles can come about in many ways, including through experience in some habit (ethismōi tini).[9]